Religious Changes in Montenegro: From the Socialist Atheization to Post-Socialist Revitalization by Bakrač, Vladimir & Blagojević, Mirko
Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe 
Volume 40 Issue 7 Article 3 
9-2020 
Religious Changes in Montenegro: From the Socialist Atheization 
to Post-Socialist Revitalization 
Vladimir Bakrač 
The University of Montenegro 
Mirko Blagojević 
Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, Serbia 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree 
 Part of the Christianity Commons, and the Eastern European Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bakrač, Vladimir and Blagojević, Mirko (2020) "Religious Changes in Montenegro: From the Socialist 
Atheization to Post-Socialist Revitalization," Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe: Vol. 40 : Iss. 
7 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree/vol40/iss7/3 
This Thirty-Year Anniversary since the Fall of Communism is brought to you for free and open access by Digital 
Commons @ George Fox University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern 
Europe by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ George Fox University. For more information, please contact 
arolfe@georgefox.edu. 




RELIGIOUS CHANGES IN MONTENEGRO – FROM THE SOCIALIST 
ATHEIZATION TO THE POST-SOCIALIST REVITALIZATION  
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of Social Sciences in Belgrade. He is the author of numerous scientific papers in the field of 
sociology of religion.   
                                                            
Abstract  
The influence, significance, and meaning of religion and religiosity in the Balkans at the end of 
the second decade of the 21st century have not diminished. Peter Berger argues that today’s 
world, with some exceptions, is deeply religious—perhaps even more than before. This attitude 
of Berger refers to modern society, but in the era of socialism, it was not so. Empirical 
verification from that period records the atheization and secularization of society. In this regard, 
the primary aim of this paper is to present a kind of panoramic review of religiosity from the era 
of socialism to the post-socialist transformation and religious revitalization. The focus of the first 
part of the paper is the analysis of de-monopolization and stigmatization of religion in socialism 
while the second part of the paper concerns the analysis of the elements of desecularization of 
society, and the post-socialist revitalization of religion in Montenegro. Subsequently, a kind of 
stability in religiosity is detected on the basis of empirical material.   
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Introduction 
Researching social phenomena is a complex task, raising many doubts. The situation is 
even more complex if it is a scientific study of religion, an ancient, complex, changeable but 
constant socio-psychological and spiritual phenomenon. Therefore, the need for precision and 
scientific responsibility in the panoramic presentation of religiosity in Montenegro, from the late 
1980s to the present day, should be constantly and carefully emphasized while studying religion 
and religiosity, perhaps even more in the Balkans than elsewhere.  
The studies of this type, which call for a review of the chronology of thematic events, do 
not represent glorification and advocacy for only one referential social system, but a credible and 
objective presentation of the social state of religiosity viewed through the prism of the sociology 
of religion. It is important to specify that the paper deals with three denominations: Orthodox, 
Roman Catholic, and Islamic, which coexist in this area. Our research aims to panoramically 
present the scope of religiosity in this republic during real socialism and conducted atheization of 
society, and then to compare it with the post-socialist period, when sociological expertise detects 
the return of religion.  
The twentieth century is marked as the century of secularization in the sociology of 
religion. There has been an erosion of religiosity in many countries, especially in the countries of 
the real socialist and socio-political system, including Montenegro. For many sociologists of 
religion, the century we have stepped into under the influence of Huntington’s theory of “the 
clash of civilizations”1 and the practical events of September 11, 2001, has looked like a century 
that promises many conflicts or “clashes of cultures.”2 Since the sociologists of religion in the 
Balkans detected the erosion of the secular paradigm and the return of religion to the public 
scene in the late 1980s, these conflicts were expected to occur in the name of religion as well. 
What is stated as the main argument in favor of desecularization is the return of religion to the 
political level, the strengthening of fundamentalism, the rise of traditional and conservative 
                                                            
1 Samjuel Hantington. Sukob civilizacija. [The Clash of Civilizations]. (Podgorica: CID. 2000). 
2 Linda Woodhead, “Five Concepts of Religion.” International Review of Sociology 21. (2011): 121-43. 
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organizations, the decline of citizens’ willingness to identify with atheism, the strengthening of 
ultra-right political parties, etc.3  
 
Review of Religiosity in Montenegro under the Mask of Socialism   
Much of the world was secularized, and secularization has been the dominant frame of 
reference for the sociological study of religion since the 1960s.4 Religions and confessional 
communities in the former socialist Yugoslavia, and therefore Montenegro as its member state, 
went through a painful experience of atheization, conducted by the regime and secularization of 
society as its subsequent (un)intended consequence.5 The historical background in Montenegro 
was marked by weakening and marginalization of religion and the church, encouraged by 
systemically conducted and imposed atheism, guided by atheistic education and upbringing, 
which all led to the process of separating people from religion. The whole system was 
ideologically shaped and adapted to the current political model. Such an attitude of the state 
towards religion can be explained from the social aspects and within the church aspects. Namely, 
considering the negative historical memories, the socialist regime believed that the 
marginalization of religion would reduce the historical inter-confessional and inter-ethnic 
hostility in The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Subsequently, there was a strong 
desire of the communist government to establish the absolute power of control over the whole 
society. The demographic trends of the population should not be neglected either. After the war, 
a large part of the population migrated from the countryside to the city, which led to a reduction 
in the rural population that, according to empirical records, has always been more religious than 
the urban population.6 The causes of high levels of secularization in Orthodox homogeneous 
                                                            
3 Timothy Crippen. “Old and new gods in the modern world: toward a theory of religious transformation.” Social 
Forces. 67, 2.(1988): 316-336: Grace Davie.  Religion in Britain since 1945. (Oxford: Blackwell.1994); Rodney 
Stark, “Secularization: R.I.P.”, Sociology of Religion 60, 3. (2000): 249-273. 
4 Bryan R. Wilson, Religion in Secular Society. (London: C. A. Watts. 1966); Peter L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy. 
(New York: Anchor Books, 1967),107; Peter L. Berger, Desekulariyacija sveta – oživljavanje religije i svetska 
politika. [The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics]. (Novi Sad: Mediteran. 2008). 
Karel Dobbelaere, “Secularization Theories and Sociological Paradigms: A Reformulation of the Private-Public 
Dichotomy and the Problem of Societal Integration.” Sociological Analysis 46. (1985); Karel Dobbelaere. 
Secularization: An Analysis at Three Levels. (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. 2002); Rodney Stark, and Lawrence 
R. Iannaccone, “Response to Lechner:”Recent Religious Declines in Quebec, Poland, and the Netherlands: A 
Theory Vindicated.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 35. (1996); Rodney Stark, “Secularization: R.I.P.”  
Steve Bruce.”Secularisation, Church and Popular Religion.” The Journal of Ecclesiastical History 62. 2011. 
5 Dragoljub Đorđević B. Beg od crkve. [Escape from the Church]. (Knjaževac: Nota, 1984). 
6 Mirko Blagojević. Religija i crkva u transformacijama društva. [Religion and the Church in the Transformations 
of Society]. (Beograd: Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju “Filip Višnjić,” 2005). 
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areas could be attributed to the internal weaknesses of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which most 
often point directly to loyalty to the regime, schism within the church, etc. The dependence of 
the Serbian Orthodox Church on the national being dates back to the Byzantine era, and it 
represents, according to Vukomanović, one of its main weaknesses, and therefore one of the 
main factors where the causes of secularization should be evident. In addition, Vukomanović 
finds three more reasons that condition the secularization, and that are primarily related to the 
Serbian Orthodox Church:  
a) persistence of the Serbian pagan heritage;  
b) permeation of the religious, confessional, and national factor;  
c) conservatism of the Serbian Orthodox Church, lack of understanding for the process of 
modernization, as well as the readiness for transformation and adaptation of the spirit of 
the new post-industrial civilization.7  
In such a socio-political climate, religion was suppressed and treated as a form of a 
person’s alienation. Such orientation represented a desire of the official socialist establishment to 
constitute, according to its views on religion, a social environment that would embody the 
Marxist understanding of religion. In accordance with the official attitude of the regime towards 
religion, cooperation between religions was obstructed, and the nurturing of culture and 
interreligious dialogue was almost absent. A kind of liberalization of the regime towards religion 
began only in the early 1980s.  
Empirical studies detect increased secularization in that period. According to Yugoslav 
studies entitled “Social Structure and Quality of Life” from 1989, 19.0% of Orthodox 
respondents considered themselves religious, 29.9% were indifferent to religion, and 51.1% were 
opposed to religion. Among Roman Catholic respondents, one third of respondents declared 
themselves as religious, one third as indifferent to religion, and one third expressed an attitude of 
opposition to religion. Members of the Islamic community declared themselves as religious in 
25.9% of the cases examined, 33.3% were indifferent and 40.8% were against religion. 
Therefore, Orthodox respondents are at the forefront of non-religiosity in comparison with the 
other two denominations. The religious practice also testifies to the low frequency of religiosity. 
In sociological studies, the indicator related to church visits is one of the most authentic 
                                                            
7 Milan Vukomanović. Sveto i mnoštvo – izazovi religijskog pluralizma. [The sacred and the multitude - the 
challenges of religious pluralism]. (Beograd: Čigoja štampa, 2001), 103. 
OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (SEPTEMBER 2020) XL, 7  35 
 
indicators of institutionalized, i.e. church religiosity. This indicator is very suitable for 
sociological expertise due to a more objective view of the religious situation in the research area. 
Hence, going to church is an indicator that is very important from the perspective of sociological 
analysis, and not only from the perspective of believers’ religiosity and religious organizations to 
which they belong. A very low percentage of going to church was recorded in Montenegro--
19%, which means that the lowest percentage of those who regularly went to church was in the 
dominant Orthodox area of Montenegro. According to the studies from 1985 and 19868 there 
were also 19% of religious respondents in Montenegro who went to church. This percentage has 
been on the rise since 1989, especially in the Orthodox areas of Yugoslavia, which can be 
understood as part of the process of increasing the public importance and the revitalization of 
religion and church.9  
 
Revitalization of Religion – the Post-Socialist Period  
With the collapse of socialism, “desecularization of the world” is put on a pedestal of 
values at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s.10 Therefore, a religious “renaissance” 
came within all traditional denominations in Montenegro (Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism, and 
Islam) in the final decade of the twentieth century. The period of the rise of religion coincides 
with the collapse of real socialism in Eastern Europe, which has convincingly questioned the 
theory of atheization and secularization as no less an important consequence of it. The theoretical 
framework in the sociology of religion experiences a kind of turning point, and the theory of 
secularization is suppressed, while the attention of theoreticians is now focused on the 
desecularization of society and the revitalization of religion towards social processes in which 
the number of people, who confessionally identify and believe, grows.11 Some sociologists of 
religion do not abandon the secular theory but admit that certain parts of the world are not yet 
                                                            
8 Stipe Pojatina. “Religija i religioznost u jugoslovenskom društvu.” [Religion and religiosity in Yugoslav society]. 
in Empirijska istraživanja društvene svesti, (Beograd: Centar za društvena istraživanja. 1988). 
9Dragomir  Pantić. “Prostorne, vremenske i socijalne koordinate religioznosti mladih u Jugoslaviji.” [Spatial, 
temporal and social coordinates of the religiosity of young people in Yugoslavia], in: S. Mijalović et al.. Deca kriz, 
(Beograd: IDN,1990),2019. Dragomir Pantić. “Religioznost građana Jugoslavije.” [Religiosity citizens of 
Yugoslavia], in Jugoslavija na kriznoj prekretnici, (Beograd: IDN. Centar za politikološka istraživanja i javno 
mnjenje. 1991). 
10 Berger, Desekularizacija sveta – oživljavanje religije i svetska politika. 
11Jeffery K. Hadden, “Religion and the Quest for Meaning and Order: Old Paradigms, New Realities,” Sociological 
Focus, 28 (1995), 89-97. 
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mature enough for such a process.12 Today, we are witnesses of desecularization, and 
sociologists of religion detect a religious renewal. Former proponents of secularization today 
admit that religion “has always been present somewhere” and that the modern world is still as 
religious as it used to be, with certain exceptions that confirm the rule.13   
When it comes to post-Yugoslav areas, where we geographically and socially locate 
Montenegro, the desecularization of society was accompanied by ethnomobilization and 
nationalism, especially during the crisis and conflicts of the 1990s, so there was an opinion that it 
was a kind of clericalization of society (of Serbia and Montenegro) while identification of the 
religious with the national was politically forced.14 It should be pointed out that, although 
religion is not always, and, in every place, politically colored, there have always been, and there 
will always be, people who do believe for personal reasons, free will, and choice. This is the 
prevailing trend. In other words, when it comes to Montenegro, the collapse of the socialist 
system was accompanied by the national political revitalization of religion. All this led to 
confessional homogenization, mobilization of religious and national groups, public support for 
religious communities, and, consequently, the greater connection of people with religion and 
church. It is now religion that gives identity and identification to the community, integrating an 
individual into the collective. This is important in conflict situations in the Balkans because 
religion and churches mobilize people into a collective that opposes another collective in a new 
situation. If the culture of a community is really endangered or only perceived in these conflicts, 
religion stands in defense of culture and tradition.15 The desecularization of society and the 
revitalization of religion in Montenegro are zealously detected by sociological studies.  
Miloš Bešić and Borislav Đukanović developed a consistently functionalist approach to 
religion and empirically confirmed it by their research in the work “Gods and People-Religiosity 
in Montenegro.” Consistent with the functionalist approach to religion, the authors start from 
Durkheim’s statement that religion represents society. Arguing that religion is a society, the 
authors imply a community, not a global society. The typical functionalist approach of the 
authors is reflected in the assertion that modern society contains many social groups that have 
                                                            
12 Steve Bruce. “On the Demise of Christianity in Britain,” in Predicting Religion, Christian, Secular and 
Alternative Futures: Theology and Religion in Interdisciplinary Perspective Series, (Aldershot: Ashgate 
Press.2003). 
13 Berger, Desekulariyacija sveta – oživljavanje religije i svetska politika. 
14 Dragoljub B. Đorđević, “Religiousness of Serbia at the Beginning of the 21st: What is It About?” in: Danijela 
Gavrilović (ed.), Revitalization of Religion - Theoretical and Comparative Approaches. (Niš: YSSS Annual, 2009). 
15 Blagojević. Religija i crkva u transformacijama društva.. 
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the character of a community, and therefore can be treated as a religion. These authors create a 
schematic setting of religion: community=transcendent=sacred=religion.16 The basic elaboration 
on which the authors base their theoretical setting refers to the conclusion that each religion 
represents a transcendent world, and therefore, each religion implies a social group (community) 
as its social carrier. These authors observe the analysis of religion in the context of the three 
main theories of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: Marxist, functionalist, and 
phenomenological theories. The authors believe that Marx’s model of class society has its own 
transcendent world, i.e. its religion. “This means that in class society we indeed deal with two 
social communities, and therefore with two religions.”17 Guided by Durkheim’s beliefs, the 
authors notice that each system of ideas, beliefs, and values is a form of religiosity because it 
contributes to the creation of the community. Their functionalist approach to religion comes to 
the fore in the claim that religion is a society in the elementary form of a community. The 
authors add that human communities are born and that they disappear, so the same is the case 
with religion, emphasizing that religion is a social phenomenon par excellence. They are 
convinced that secular religiosity is no less a religion than classical religiosity. The authors 
emphasize that many human values, systems of ideas, and beliefs that transcend the individual 
and integrate him into some forms of human society (into the community) represent a religion.  
Sociological and empirical studies in Montenegro also show an evident revitalization of 
conventional religiosity. The study of Bešić and Đukanović consisted of four ordinal scales of 
religiosity of ten items each that measured religious belief, social behavior according to a certain 
religious pattern, religious practice, and knowledge of religious doctrine. The scales measured 
the overall religiosity of the respondents (Catholic, Orthodox, and Islamic denomination), and 
separately the religiosity of people in the mentioned denominations. According to this study, the 
religiosity of one fifth of the respondents is low, the religiosity of 57.1% is medium, and 22.2% 
of respondents are religious. If we express ourselves as authors, according to a continuous scale, 
we arrive at the conclusion that religiosity in Montenegro is high and amounts to 117.1 in the 
interval from a minimum of 40 to a maximum of 170 points. As for denominations individually, 
this study shows that the religiosity of Catholics is on average regarding general religiosity, the 
religiosity of the members of the Islamic religious community is above average, while the 
                                                            
16 Miloš Bešić & Borislav Đukanović. Bogovi i ljudi. [Gods ana Peoples]. (Podgorica: CID, 2000), 67. 
17 Ibid. 
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religiosity of Orthodox respondents is below average. According to this study, 25.8% of the 
Orthodox, 29.1% of the Roman Catholics, and 35.3% of the Muslims respect religious rites.18 
The 2003 census in Montenegro shows that 74.23% of people declare themselves as the 
Orthodox, 17.74% as the Muslims, and 3.54% as the Roman Catholics. The 2011 census detects 
72.07% of the Orthodox, 19.10% of the Muslims, and 3.44% of the Roman Catholics. Although, 
according to the census, certain trends in the religiosity of the population of Montenegro can be 
monitored, in terms of increase, stagnation or decrease in denominational affiliation, it still 
contains data on nominal religiosity, without providing a deeper analysis. The census provides 
only a representation of confessional identification, i.e. an external representation of religiosity.  
The 2008 European Value Studies, which includes Montenegro, shows that 88% of 
respondents declare they believe in God, while 87% declare they are religious19. According to 
this study, 78% of respondents believe that religion is important in life, 67% of respondents 
believe that God is important in life, and 70% believe they find strength and comfort in faith. 
The 2013 study on the youth population detects a kind of stability in religiosity. 60.9% of the 
entire youth population declare themselves as convinced believers who accept everything that 
religion teaches, while 20.6% of respondents declare themselves as religious but without 
accepting everything that religion teaches. Thus, 81.5% of respondents are religious in various 
modalities, 11.3% are neutral, while 7.2% of respondents are not religious. According to this 
study, 58.4% of Orthodox respondents declare themselves as religious and 23.0% as religious but 
without accepting everything that religion teaches. In general, 81.4% of Orthodox respondents 
are religious. 58.4% of Roman Catholic respondents declare themselves as religious and 22.8% 
declare themselves as religious but without accepting everything that religion teaches. 68.4% of 
Islamic respondents are religious, 22% are religious but without accepting everything that 
religion teaches, while 11.6% are not religious. The structure of religiosity among Orthodox and 
Roman Catholic respondents is very similar, especially when it comes to religiosity that does not 
imply the acceptance of everything religion teaches. On the other hand, the indicator of 
religiosity regarding visits to religious buildings shows greater zeal of the Roman Catholics: 
                                                            
18 Ibid., 137.   
19 http://wwweuropeanvaluesstudy.eu/page/about-evs.html  
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37.6% of Orthodox respondents and 54.4% of the Roman Catholics go to church monthly, and 
36.6% of respondents go to the mosque at least once a month.20  
The study of religiosity on the entire population in Montenegro was conducted in 2016 as 
well. The religiosity was tested by creating three degrees of religiosity of the total score--low, 
medium, and high. These scores ranged from a minimum of 40 to a maximum of 170 points, 
while 40 indicated the lowest possible religiosity and 170 the highest. Respondents who had up 
to 96 points were classified in the group of “lowest score of religiosity,” respondents who had 97 
to 137 belonged to the group of “medium religiosity,” and respondents who had over 137 points 
were “highly religious” respondents. The arithmetic mean of 116.46 indicates the high religiosity 
of the population in Montenegro. The study shows that overall religiosity is still significantly 
high. Based on the F-test, the differences between denominations in terms of general religiosity 
are statistically highly significant (F = 46.126; p = 0.000). The Orthodox are less religious than 
the Roman Catholics (I-J = -10.05174; P = 0.000), and even less than the Muslims (I-J = - 
20.20460; P = 0.000). Besides being more religious than the Orthodox, the Roman Catholics are 
less religious than the Muslims (I-J = -10.15286; p <0.000). According to the same study, 
religious practice is regularly carried out by 27.6% of Orthodox, 30.6% of Roman Catholic and 
36.0% of Muslim respondents.21 In comparison with the previous studies,22 a kind of stability in 
religiosity is stated.  
 
Conclusion 
Based on the analysis of religiosity in Montenegro from the socialist atheization to the 
post-socialist revitalization of religion, we can draw several conclusions. The socialist, socio-
political system did not have a benevolent attitude towards religion. The view of religion was 
most often harmonized with the policy of the official socialist establishment. This is especially 
visible in the dominant Orthodox areas such as Montenegro. Official studies from that period, 
which detect a low score of religiosity, testify to that.  
                                                            
20 Vladimir Bakrač. Relija i mladi – religioznost mladih u Crnoj Gori [Religion and the Young: religiosity of the 
Youth in Montenegro]. (Podgorica: Narodna knjiga. 2013). 
21 Borislav Đukanović & Nikola, Šaranović. “Religioznost u Crnoj Gori 1999-2016.” [Religion in Montenegro 
1999-2016] in Sociološki presjek crnogorskog društva. (Podgorica. Crnogorska akademija nauka i umjetnosti. 
2016). 
22 Bešić &  Đukanović. Bogovi i ljudi.  
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However, theoretical and empirical expertise identified the revitalization of religion and 
the desecularization of society in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Strict advocates of the theory of 
secularization are forced to change their official attitude. The empirical expertise in Montenegro 
detects a mass return to traditional religions and a significant percentage of religious residents. 
With the collapse of socialism as a quasi-religion, traditional religion enters the scene. In the 
second decade of the twenty-first century, studies record a kind of stability in religiosity. When it 
comes to religiosity in Montenegro, it is important to point out that the revitalization of religion 
is widespread among members of all denominations in this republic, but with certain 
specificities. Namely, members of the Orthodox denomination are the least religious, and the 
Roman Catholics are in the middle between the Orthodox and the Muslims, while the Muslims 
are convincingly the most religious.  
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